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Abstract 
We claim that a reason for why unregulated investor-owned local monopolies do not always charge 
the monopoly price is that they are threatened by customer complaints that may lead to retaliations 
from local elected officials. When investor-owned monopolies are exposed to this threat they will 
mimic the price(s) of their neighbour(s); the stronger the threat, the higher the spatial price 
correlation. The threat increases when elected officials have pro-consumer preferences and 
neighbours are geographically close. The empirical analysis, based on a complete cross-sectional data 
set from the Swedish district heating sector in 2007, confirms the theoretical predictions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been noted that local monopolies owned by private investors do not always charge prices that 
are significantly higher than those charged by publicly owned monopolies, and/or that the 
introduction of formal price regulations does not always reduce prices (Edwards and Waverman, 
2006; Stigler and Friedland, 1962; Wallsten, 2001). One may ask, therefore, why local monopolies 
owned by private investors (IOMs) do not always set their prices at a higher level. Some 
commentators have suggested that the explanation may be that local monopolies owned by public 
bodies (POMs) are not relevant benchmarks since they might not maximise social welfare,1 and others 
have pointed at the difficulty of designing regulatory models that appropriately incentivise price 
reductions (e.g. Joskow, 2008). These explanations assume that the price-setting incentives are 
primarily homogenous within sectors, whereas empirical studies have pointed at substantial price-
setting heterogeneity within monopolistic (network) sectors (Altissimo et al., 2006; White, 1996). In 
the present paper, we propose a new explanation to why IOMs depart from the textbook behaviour, an 
explanation that is based on heterogeneous threat of regulatory intervention.   
 
Our claim is that locally, unregulated IOMs voluntarily hold back their prices when they are 
threatened by complaints from customers that are likely to result in retaliations from local elected 
officials. The probability of a customer complaint is positively correlated with the heterogeneity in 
pricing behaviour that the customer observes when comparing the price in her/his jurisdiction with the 
price(s) in neighbouring jurisdiction(s). Vote-maximising elected officials typically have an arsenal of 
different responses to choose from in this situation, ranging from relatively soft interventions such as 
more restrictive building/location permit processes and use of fuel types to more extreme 
interventions such as receivership (i.e. that the local public administration takes over the responsibility 
of the utility’s operative work) and expropriation (i.e. that ownership is legally transferred to the local 
council).2 However, elected officials are either pro-consumer or pro-firm, which affects their 
probability to intervene. IOMs respond to this threat by mimicking the prices set by their neighbours, 
with the level of threat being positively correlated with the spatial price correlation.   
 
Our claim is related to the literature on regulatory threat, which says that firms self-regulate their 
present profits to gain higher profits in the future (Brunekreeft, 2004; Leidy, 1994; Block and 
Feinstein, 1986). Firms’ incentive to react to threat has been justified from their desire to reduce the 
                                                            
1 Two established arguments are Niskanen’s (1968) budget-maximising principle and Stigler’s (1971) 
suggestion about industry capture.   
2 Both receivership and expropriation have been used in the locally monopolized electricity distribution sector in 
Sweden, and re-municipalisation (not renewal of concession contracts) has occurred in the German electricity 
distribution sector and the French water sector in recent years in response to high consumer prices.  
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overall degree of scrutiny from outside agents, transfer scrutiny to other firms (Decker, 1998) and/or 
prevent more stringent regulatory activity in the future (Lutz et al., 1998). In previous studies it has 
been taken as given that a firm’s exposure to threat is positively correlated with its price level, or price 
cost margin (Glazer and McMillan, 1992; Brunekreeft, 2004; Bawa and Sibley, 1980).3 The validity 
of this claim hinges on the assumption that an isolated price level is informative to policy makers. 
However, even if one imposes the weaker assumption that policy makers can react to price changes, 
this can be an unrealistically strong assumption when outside agents suffer from a lack of cost 
information.4 As an alternative, it has been suggested that monitoring agents can compare conditions 
set simultaneously by (many) firms and that this can explain firms’ behaviour relatively well 
(Gilpatric et al., 2011).5 In an unregulated market where customers cannot rely on policy makers to 
effectively monitor monopolies, they can themselves form expectations about the monopolies’ degree 
of ‘abusiveness’. If customers compare conditions set simultaneously by different monopolies, they 
can compare their own conditions with those set in neighbouring jurisdictions. The preference for 
closer neighbours follows from Dixit’s (2003) random matching model, which postulates that 
individuals are more likely to ‘match’ the closer (according to physical distance or some 
socioeconomic criteria) they are located. The presence of strategic interaction between neighbouring 
jurisdictions has been confirmed empirically in studies on a broad range of local policy setting (e.g. 
Bordignon et al., 2003; Buettner, 2001; Brueckner, 1998). Customers’ tendency to use conditions in 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a basis for why they complain about monopolistic conditions was also 
observed by Söderberg (2008) in his review of a large number of customer complaints in the regulated 
Swedish electricity distribution sector.  
 
Several studies in the marketing literature suggest that when a price is perceived as unfair, it provokes 
anger and increases the likelihood of customer responses, e.g. switching of supplier (Antón et al., 
2007; Athanassopoulos, 2000; Campbell, 1999).6 Similar arguments have been used to build 
theoretical models in the economic literature (Di Tella and Durba, 2009; Rotemberg, forthcoming, 
                                                            
3 More recent theoretical studies have extended the earlier models of regulatory threat in different directions, e.g. 
the pricing decision under the threat of potential divestiture of firms (Tanaka, 2011) and the pricing of a utility 
with an expanding network facing a threat of regulatory intervention (Chisari and Kessides, 2009). 
4 For example, it has been claimed that the lack of relevant (cost) information is the primary complication 
involved in regulating locally monopolistic utility sectors (Joskow, 2005).  
5 Gilpatric et al. (2011) compare two regulatory evaluation mechanisms – one where firms’ present conditions 
are evaluated based on their previous conditions and one where several firms are compared with each other 
based on conditions set simultaneously.  
6 In the context of local monopoly services, it has been demonstrated that demand is positively related to 
regulatory compliance (Stafford, 2007).   
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2005). In Rotemberg’s (2005) model, firms internalise that customers react negatively when they 
become convinced that a price is unfair. Di Tella and Dubra (2009) reach a similar conclusion and 
show that equilibria exist where customers are not angry.7 Rotemberg (forthcoming) introduces the 
notion of a reference price that the current price is compared with to form an opinion about whether a 
price is fair or not. He suggests that this reference price can be a price charged previously by the firm. 
As pointed out above, the present paper takes an alternative position as it uses prices set 
simultaneously by neighbours as reference price(s).  
 
Lastly, we also draw on the literature that focuses on the influence of local political ideology on 
regulatory decisions. These studies have suggested that left-wing governments tend to be relatively 
more pro-consumer (Holburn and Spiller, 2002; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2006, Besley and Coate, 
2003; Cambini and Rondi, 2010). Similar to Biggar and Söderberg (2011), we highlight the influence 
of local political ideology on the pricing strategies of district heating utilities, even in the absence of 
any formal regulatory mechanism.  
 
The claim that spatial price heterogeneity is a source of regulatory threat in local monopolistic sectors 
has not yet been modelled theoretically, and it has only received sporadic empirical attention. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation for this mechanism and to evaluate its 
existence empirically based on the Swedish district heating sector. This sector consists of a mixture of 
unregulated IOMs and POMs that are confined by municipal borders. The Swedish district heating 
sector provides a unique setting for studying monopolies’ price incentives since, contrary to most 
network sectors, the IOMs are not subject to formal price control mechanisms. Also, the Swedish 
electoral system can be characterised as bi-partisan where the ruling party/coalition is either left- or 
right-wing. There is empirical evidence that left-wing local councils in Sweden generally intervene 
more in markets (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008), and Biggar and Söderberg (2011) find that the Swedish 
district heating utilities adopt a more pro-consumer pricing behaviour under left-wing local councils. 
We utilise a complete cross-sectional data set from 2007 that has not been used before in published 
work. 
 
Our theoretical model, which can be viewed as a new variant of the Bertrand model, complements 
existing theoretical explanations for regulatory threat by showing that local monopolists, under certain 
conditions, have incentives to mimic the prices set by their neighbours. Similar ‘neighbouring’ effects 
have been observed previously in the context of regulatory threat. For example, Block and Feinstein 
                                                            
7 This is confirmed empirically by Arora and Cason (1996) as they show that firms are more inclined to 
voluntarily comply with regulatory conditions when they have relatively more customer contacts.   
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(1986) show that the cost of highway construction is reduced after antitrust enforcement in 
neighbouring jurisdictions, and Eckert and Eckert (2010) find that firms are more likely to comply 
with environmental regulations when neighbours have recently been found in violation.   
 
Several empirical studies have looked at firms’ pricing behaviour in response to policy makers’ 
(likely) actions (Olmstead and Rhode, 1985; Erfle and McMillan, 1990; Driffield and Ioannidis, 
2000). The study that is most similar to ours is Ellison and Wolfram’s (2006) investigation of 
pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. during a period of a relatively intense scrutiny from policy makers. 
Similar to our study, they suggest that firms voluntarily hold back prices to reduce the threat of 
regulatory intervention and that firms’ responses are positively correlated with their degree of 
regulatory vulnerability. However, our study differs from Ellison and Wolfram’s (2006) in terms of 
both market structure and source of threat since they consider a market subject to competition and 
when the level of threat is related to the firms’ own price levels.    
 
The paper proceeds with a section that lays the foundation of our theoretical model. Our propositions 
are presented in Section 3. A background on the Swedish district heating sector is given in Section 4, 
and the empirical analysis is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
Consider a set of unregulated locally monopolistic firms i where each firm faces its own demand for 
heat, )( ii pq , and ip  denotes the price. We assume that 0<′iq  and 0)(lim =∞→ iip pqi . The cost of 
providing the heat is denoted ))(( iii pqc . If the firm is an IOM, its profit is expressed as 
))(()()( iiiiiiii pqcpqpp −=π , where )( ii pπ  is strictly concave, i.e. 0)( <′′ ii pπ . The monopoly 
price is denoted )(maxarg ii
m
i p p π= , where .0)( =′ mii pπ  The relevant price range for the firm is 
m
ii pp ≤  since raising the price beyond the monopoly price decreases its profit. Note that 0)( >′ ii pπ  
holds for mii pp < . Consumer surplus in each district is expressed as ∫∞ ′′=
ip iiiii
pdpqpcs )()( , where 
0)()( <−=′ iiii pqpsc  and 0)()( >′−=′′ iiii pqpsc for the relevant price range. Thus, )( ii pcs  is 
strictly convex. Social surplus in each district is then represented by the sum of the profit and 
consumer surplus: )()()( iiiiii pcsppsw += π . The welfare-maximising price is denoted 
)(maxarg iii p swp = , where 0)( =′ ii pws . Maximised social surplus is denoted 
iiiiiii scpcspswws +≡+≡ π)()( . As the price increases beyond ip , the social surplus decreases 
due to the increase in the deadweight loss, i.e. 0)()()( <′+′=′ iiiiii pscppws π  for ii pp < . We 
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assume that )( ii psw  is strictly concave, i.e. 0)()()( <′′+′′=′′ iiiiii pscppws π . Lastly, we mention 
some relevant facts that we will come back to later: miii ppp << , iii p ππ >)( , iii scpcs <)(  and 
iii wspsw <)(  hold, since 0>′iπ , 0<′isc  and 0<′iws , respectively.  
 
2.1 Structure of firms 
A fully privately owned firm is only concerned with its own profit. A public firm, on the other hand, 
is concerned with consumer surplus as well as its own profit. Considering the private and public 
structures of firms, we define the surplus of firm i as follows:  
 
)()()( iiiiiii pcsppS απ += , (1) 
 
where [ )1,0∈iα .8 When 0=iα , the firm is fully private and only seeks to maximise its profit. When 
iα<0 , the firm is a public firm that maximises the weighted sum of its profit and consumer surplus. 
A larger iα  implies that the firm has a more public character, putting more emphasis on consumer 
surplus.9 When iα  approaches 1, the firm becomes the (local) council itself and seeks to maximise 
full social surplus. We will discuss this extreme case later.  
 
Noting that 0)( >′′ ii psc  and [ )1,0∈iα , )()( iiiii pscpsc ′′<′′α  holds. After adding )( ii pπ  on both 
sides, we obtain 
 
)()()( iiiiiii pscppS ′′+′′=′′ απ   
)()( iii pscp ′′+′′< π  
,0<  (2) 
 
where the last inequality comes from the strict concavity of )( ii psw . Thus, )( ii pS  is strictly 
concave. The maximiser of the firm’s surplus is denoted )(maxarg ii
s
i pSp = . sip  is unique since 
)( ii pS  is strictly concave. Obviously, the maximiser 
s
ip  for the firm is greater than the full welfare-
maximising price ip  for the council, and less than or equal to the full profit-maximising price 
m
ip  for 
the fully private firm, i.e. mi
s
ii ppp ≤< . sip  coincides with mip  when iα  is 0.  
                                                            
8  This type of formulation is usually employed in the literature on mixed markets involving private and public 
firms (e.g. De Fraja and Delbono 1989; Matsumura 1998). 
9 iα  can represent the share of public ownership.   
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Note that 0)( =′ sii pS . It follows from the strict concavity of )( ii pS  that )( ii pS  is increasing for 
s
ii pp < , i.e. 
 
 0)()()( >′+′=′ iiiiiii pscppS απ  (3) 
 
for sii pp < . Furthermore, iii SpS >)(  holds for siii ppp <<  since 0)( >′ ii pS  for this price range.  
 
2.2 Expected surplus of firms 
Next we introduce a functional relationship between the probability of regulatory intervention and the 
prices set by the firms. The probability of regulatory intervention is assumed to be a function of the 
price difference between two neighbouring firms, i.e. )( iii pp −−θ . The regulatory authority observes 
prices as well as introduces price regulation in district i with probability )( iii pp −−θ  where )(⋅iθ  is 
increasing, i.e. 0>′iθ . ii pp −−  can be both positive and negative. We consider the range of 
probability, 10 << iθ , for the relevant price range.10 It should be noted that the probability of 
intervention is positive even when firm i  charges a price below the neighbour’s price. Furthermore, 
we assume that )(⋅iθ  is strictly convex, i.e. 0>′′iθ  for the relevant range.   
 
Once the regulatory authority decides to intervene in district i, price regulation is introduced. We 
consider that the price will be regulated at ip . At this level, the firm obtains a constant surplus, 
iiiiiiiiiii scpcsppSS απαπ +≡+=≡ )()()( . Considering a risk-neutral firm, we can now express 
its expected surplus as 
 
iiiiiiiiiiii SpppSppppES )()())(1(),( −−− −+−−= θθ  
))()(()( iiiiiiii SpSpppS −−−= −θ . (4) 
 
The second term on the second line of (4) can be interpreted as a form of expected penalty. When firm 
i chooses some price level ip  given ip− , its surplus )( ii pS  is reduced by iii SpS −)(  with 
probability )( iii pp −−θ . This highlights that the expected surplus of firm i depends not only on its 
                                                            
10 We rule out the extreme cases when the regulatory authority intervenes with 100 percent certainty (θi=1), and 
when there is no risk of intervention (θi=0).  
8 
 
own price ip , but also on ip−  in the neighbouring district –i. Using the terms of profit and consumer 
surplus, expected surplus can be written as 
 
))(( iiiiiiiiii sccscsES απαπθαπ +−+−+= . (5) 
 
Firm i maximises its expected surplus given the price of neighbouring firm –i. The first-order 
condition for firm i can be written as 
 
0)()1( =−′−′−=∂
∂
iiiii
i
i SSS
p
ES θθ . (6) 
 
Recall that iii SpS >)(  for siii ppp << , 0>′iS  for sii pp < , and 0<′′S , as discussed in 
subsection 2.1. Moreover, note that 10 << iθ , 0>′iθ , and 0>′′iθ , as discussed here. We then have 
 
0)(2)1(
2
2
<−′′−′′−′′−=∂
∂≡ iiiiiii
i
i
i SSSS
p
ES θθθφ  (7) 
 
for siii ppp <<  regarding the second-order condition.  
 
2.3 The council 
Before turning to the analysis of regulatory threat, we explore the decision of the council in relation to 
the model of the firm. As discussed in the introduction of this section, the council wants to set the 
price at ip  to maximise the social surplus )( ii psw  in district i. This coincides with the decision of 
the firm, which wants to maximise its expected surplus ),( iii ppES −  when iα  approaches 1.  
 
When iα  approaches 1, we have ))(()( iiiiiiiiiiii sccscswsswswES +−+−+=−−= ππθπθ  
and )()1( iiiiip
ES wsswws
i
i −′−′−=∂
∂ θθ . Noting that 0)( =′ ii pws  and )( iii pswws ≡ , we can easily 
verify that ip satisfies the first-order condition of firm i, i.e. 0=∂
∂
i
i
p
ES , when iα  approaches 1. Here 
we assume that iES  with 1=iα  is strictly concave for the relevant range, i.e.  
 
0)(2)1( <−′′−′′−′′− iiiiiii wsswwsws θθθ . (8) 
 
9 
 
 
3. EFFECTS OF REGULATORY THREAT 
We investigate the effects of regulatory threat in detail. As discussed in the previous section, the 
expected surplus of the firm is affected by the neighbouring price through the probability of 
regulatory intervention. Thus, even though the firm is a local monopolist, each firm strategically 
chooses its price in each jurisdiction, taking into account the price(s) of neighbouring jurisdiction(s). 
This can be regarded as a new variation of the Bertrand model where spatial price competition is 
driven by regulatory threat. 
 
Technically, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium by solving the first-order conditions (6) 
simultaneously. Let us characterise the equilibrium prices ),( ** ii pp −  in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium price *ip  is such that 
s
iii ppp << * . 
 
Proof. Noting that 0)( =′ sii pS , isii SpS >)(  and 0>′iθ , we have 
 
0))((
*
<−′−=∂
∂
−− =
= i
s
iii
pp
ppi
i SpS
p
ES
ii
s
ii
θ . 
 
Thus, firm i can make more profit by choosing a price less than sip  for any given 
*
ip− . Next, noting 
that 10 << iθ  and 0)( >′ ii pS , we have 
 
0)()1(
*
>′−=∂
∂
−−
−
=
= iii
pp
ppi
i pS
p
ES
ii
ii
θ . 
 
This implies that firm i can make more profit by choosing a price greater than ip  for any given 
*
ip− . 
Therefore, *ip  is such that 
s
iii ppp << * . ■ 
 
Without any regulatory threat, the firm would have chosen sip . However, once the firm faces some 
regulatory threat, it strategically charges a price lower than sip , even though it is a local monopolist. 
10 
 
In what follows, our analysis is concerned with the relevant price range of siii ppp <<  unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
We further examine the strategic reaction of the firm under regulatory threat. The first-order condition 
(6) for firm i yields the best response function )( iii pBRp −= . When the decisions of the firms are 
‘strategic complements’, the slope of the best response curve is positive. In contrast, when the 
decisions of the firms are ‘strategic substitutes’, the slope of the best response curve is negative.11 In 
the next proposition we show that ip  and ip−  are strategic complements.  
 
Proposition 2. Prices are strategic complements, i.e. 0
2 >∂∂
∂
− ii
i
pp
ES .  
 
Proof. Noting that iii SpS >)( , 0>′iS , 0>′iθ  and 0>′′iθ , we have 
 
0)(
2
>−′′+′′=∂∂
∂≡
− iiiiiii
i
i SSSpp
ES θθψ . (9) 
■ 
 
This proposition implies that the slope of the best response curve is positive: 
 
0)(
2
2
2
>−=−=′
∂
∂
∂∂
∂
− −
i
i
ii
i
p
ES
pp
ES
i
i
ii pRB φ
ψ
.  (10) 
 
The current model is different from the standard Bertrand model. Each firm is a local monopolist that 
faces its own demand. Despite this fact, regulatory threat induces each local monopolist to react 
strategically, taking into account the price(s) of neighbouring jurisdiction(s). As a result, regulatory 
threat leads to a positive price correlation among jurisdictions. An interesting question is how the 
structure of the firm affects its strategic reaction. Thus, we next examine the effects of changing iα  
on the slope of the best response curve, )( ii pRB −′ . We obtain the following results: 
 
Proposition 3. When iα  increases, the slope of the best response curve decreases, i.e. 0<∂
′∂
i
iRBα . 
                                                            
11 See e.g. Tirole (1988).  
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Proof. See Appendix 1. ■ 
 
If a firm is fully private with 0=iα , the slope of the best response curve is the steepest. If a firm 
gains a more public character with a larger iα , the slope of the best response curve becomes flatter. 
These results follow from the publicly owned firm’s incentive to restrain its price, taking account of 
the consumer surplus in its district. Therefore, when iα  increases, the slope of the best response curve 
decreases, and hence the positive correlation of prices among districts becomes weaker.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, when iα  approaches 1, the firm becomes the council itself, and the price it 
chooses approaches ip . ip  is determined irrespective of the neighbouring price since ip  is the 
maximiser of full social surplus )( ii psw . Consequently, 
i
iRBα∂
′∂  approaches 0 when iα  approaches 1.  
 
Lastly, we extend and refine our model by introducing a proxy parameter (0,1)iμ ∈  that represents 
the strength of regulatory threat. We assume that a higher value of iμ  corresponds to a situation 
where the regulatory threat is stronger. Specifically, two situations are worth noting, based on 
descriptive statistics presented in Section 4. First, utilities operating under pro-consumer councils will 
face more severe downward pressure on prices than those operating under pro-firm councils. Thus, it 
is assumed that iμ  takes a higher value when elected officials have more consumer-friendly 
preferences. Second, neighbours located relatively close to each other are subject to more serious 
price comparison than distant neighbours. Hence, it is assumed that iμ  takes a higher value when 
neighbouring jurisdictions are geographically closer.  
 
Given some observed level of price difference between two districts, the probability of regulatory 
intervention should be higher when iμ  is larger. Thus, it is straightforward to rewrite the probability 
of intervention as ( )i i i ip pμθ −− .12 The expected surplus of firm i can now be rewritten as 
 
( , ) ( ) ( )( ( ) )i i i i i i i i i i i iES p p S p p p S p Sμθ− −= − − − . (11) 
                                                            
12 We can also assume multiple parameters for the strength of the regulatory threat: for example, (0,1)aiμ ∈  for 
the preferences of elected officials and (0,1)biμ ∈  for the geographical proximity of neighbouring districts. Then 
the probability of intervention can be expressed as ( )a bi i i i ip pμ μ θ −− . However, this alteration does not change 
the main results of the model.  
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In the following, the double bars are used to express all corresponding terms that include iμ . We then 
obtain the following results regarding the effects of changing iμ  on the slope of the best response 
curve, )( ii pRB −′ : 
 
Proposition 4. When iμ  increases, the slope of the best response curve increases, i.e. 0iiBRμ ′∂∂ > .  
 
Proof. See Appendix 1. ■ 
 
This proposition implies that the response of a firm to the neighbouring price is positively related to 
the strength of the regulatory threat. Firms are exposed to stronger regulatory threat when elected 
officials are more pro-consumer and neighbouring jurisdictions are geographically closer. When iμ  
increases, the slope of the best response curve increases and hence the positive correlation of prices 
among districts becomes stronger. 
 
 
4. THE SWEDISH DISTRICT HEATING SECTOR 
The district heating technology builds on the principle of centralised heat production where the heat is 
distributed under high pressure to customers’ properties through a network of underground pipelines 
carrying hot water or steam. At the customer’s property, a heat exchanger extracts heat energy and the 
cooler water is returned to the heat centre to be re-heated and re-distributed. District heating meets 
approximately 50% (or 47 TWh) of the total heat demand in Sweden and it is the most common 
heating alternative for multi-dwelling houses in 234 of the total 290 municipalities (SCA, 2009; SCB, 
2009). Networks only exist in densely populated areas over a certain size and it is rare that networks 
are connected over municipal borders.  
 
In 2007, 30 % of the utilities were IOM and 36% operated in municipalities with a right-wing 
dominated council. 13 While ideological composition of the local council must be treated as 
endogenous in the subsequent analysis, we will argue that IOMs and POMs are structurally similar 
and can be considered as random samples. This argument is based on the high degree of similarity 
                                                            
13 In our empirical investigation, an investor-owned district heating utility is defined as a utility where private 
investors control any share > 0 of the utility. Söderberg (2011) shows that private investors tend to determine 
the economic behaviour of Swedish energy utilities irrespective of whether they are minority or majority 
owners. 
13 
 
between the two sub-samples in terms of climate conditions, population characteristics, input price 
levels and network characteristics (detailed statistics are provided in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2).   
 
Municipal-level data from 2007 shows that the average price per MWh for a multi-dwelling property 
that consumes 193 MWh of heat is 653 SEK and 663 SEK when the utility is a POM and operating 
under left- and right-wing councils, respectively.14 When the utility is IOM, the price is 688 SEK 
when the council is left-wing and 710 SEK when the council is right-wing. Although these prices are 
not statistically different, they do indicate that utilities under left-wing councils charge lower prices 
than those under right-wing councils, and that POMs charge lower prices than IOMs.  
 
Pair-wise correlations between prices in municipality i and its neighbours i− , where i  is IOM and 
{ }1...,,2,1 −=− ii  is ordered in distance between i  and i− , show that the correlation is 0.44 between 
i  and 1=− i  and 0.28 between i  and 2=− i  (the results are similar when i operates under left- and 
right-wing councils). The correlations for higher values of i−  are insignificant. Similar calculations 
for when i  is POM show that the correlation is 0.31 when 1=− i  and the council is left-wing. 
Correlations for higher values of i− , and when the local council is right-wing, are insignificantly 
different from 0. The picture that emerges from these descriptive figures is that (i) neighbouring 
prices are significantly correlated, yet the correlation is generally confined to the closest neighbour, 
(ii) IOMs are substantially more affected by neighbours’ prices than are their POM counterparts, and 
(iii) utilities operating under left-wing (rather than right-wing) councils attach more weight to the 
price of their closest neighbour.  
 
There is no statistics available on complaints about district heating prices, but a recent study on the 
characteristics of district heating coverage in local and national Swedish newspapers shows that prices 
are the most frequently covered topic and that the tone is more critical when the utility is an IOM 
(Palm and Magnusson, 2009). This shows that customers have an effective channel to reach out with 
their complaints to elected officials. Anecdotal evidence from utility representatives and media 
reporting also indicates that municipalities can (and do) make decisions that have a substantial impact 
on utilities’ financial performance.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 These prices represent the price paid by a multi-dwelling property that is considered to be a ‘national average 
property’. See Section 5.1 for further details.  
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5. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
Based on the insights from Section 4, we want to empirically investigate whether ip  is influenced by 
1=−ip , i.e. the price charged by i’s closest neighbour. Propositions 3 and 4 postulate that the 
relationship between ip  and 1=−ip  is stronger when i is an IOM and when i faces a stronger 
regulatory threat. This translates into a functional form that can be written as βxW iii pp += =− 1γ , 
where γ is the parameter denoting the spatial association between ip  and 1=−ip . W is a weight matrix 
consisting of predetermined proxies for the level of threat between i  and all i− .  
 
To allow public and private utilities to have different values of γ, and for private utilities to respond 
differently to left- and right-wing dominated local councils, it is necessary to add two additional 
spatial terms where the elements in the second and third weight matrixes are multiplied with the type 
of ownership and ownership/political majority, respectively. The measures of ownership and political 
orientation can be continuous, as in the theoretical model, yet here we use two binary variables where 
b takes the value 1 if the utility is classified as an IOM and r takes the value 1 if the local council has 
a right-wing majority.15 To increase flexibility, we allow the price variables to be transformed by λ, 
where [ ]1,1−=λ  and where λ=0 represents the natural logarithm. Hence, the general model that we 
want to estimate is formulated as 
 
iiiiii pppp εγγγ λλλλ ++++= =−=−=− βxWWW 133122111 , (12) 
 
where the elements in W1, W2, and W3 are calculated as 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =−=
−−−
otherwise0
1for1,
,,1
idw iiii , ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =−=
−−−
otherwise0
1for1,
,,2
idbw iiiii  and ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =−=
−−−
otherwise0
1for1,
,,3
idbrw iiiiii . 
 
iid −,  is the Euclidian distance between the centres of the largest urban communities in i and –i. The 
inversed distance reduces the weight for more distant neighbours. Similar weighting structures are 
common in the applied spatial literature (e.g. Lambert et al., 2010; Zhou and Kockelman, 2009; Lee 
and Yu, 2009).16 However, when only –i=1 is included on the RHS, it is possible that distance is 
already internalised in the model, and hence the value of including the distance will be investigated 
more closely.  
 
                                                            
15 Note that α used in Sections 2 and 3 is related to b as b=1-α.  
16 Lee and Yu (2010) use a piecewise function that is decreasing in the distance between i and –i.   
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The x vector consists of b, r and cost characteristics. Cost is assumed to be influenced by the unit 
costs of fuel ( fip ) and labour (
l
ip ).
17 In addition, firms that rely on physical networks typically have 
a cost structure that depends on network characteristics. We include the amount of energy produced 
(qi) to account for economies of scale in the production, and total network length ( i? ) to account for 
scale effects in the distribution. Also, two strategic behaviours can influence the pricing behaviour 
when networks are subject to expansion. First, Chisari and Kessides (2009) point out that a utility can 
have incentives to keep its price low to attract customers during the initial phase of the expansion, and 
then raise the price as the network approaches its optimum size. This suggests that price and market 
share are positively related.  However, non-adopters of district heating would prefer a high price to 
increase public revenue, yet this group will only dominate as long as district heating has a market 
share below 50% in the heating market. Once the market share exceeds 50%, adopters will be in 
majority and will lobby for lower prices. This line of argument suggests that the relation between 
market share and price is negative. To control for these potential effects, we add a variable mi for the 
district heating’s market share in the local residential energy market. Utilities’ mix of customer types 
is accounted for by including share of detached houses, si. Nine firm dummies are also included to 
control for instances when a particular utility is responsible for the district heating operation in more 
than one municipality.  
 
5.1 Data 
Data is collected from the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate, The Swedish District Heating 
Association, Statistics Sweden, the ‘Nils Holgersson’s annual price comparisons’, and the 
utilities/municipalities directly. The data set is cross-sectional for the year 2007 and represents all 242 
municipalities where district heating is a significant source of heating in the largest urban area, 
excluding Gotland, which is an island. Descriptive statistics and further details about the variables in 
(12) are provided in Table A2.2 in Appendix 2.  
 
The price ip  is the average price (fixed plus variable) paid per MWh for a multi-dwelling property 
that consumes 193 MWh of heat and requires 3 860 m3 of water pass-through per year. The 
correlations with prices for other standardised customer types (80MWh, 500 MWh and 1 000 MWh) 
are high (between 0.94 and 0.96), which means that ip  can be viewed as the average price for all 
multi-dwelling properties.  
 
                                                            
17 Cost of capital is not considered since it is not subject to geographical heterogeneity. 
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Fuel price is total costs of fuels divided by total amount of kWh produced. This price can be negative 
since utilities are paid to dispose of public waste, which sometimes is a substantial fuel type. Labour 
price is average municipal salary (net local taxes) in the public sector. This is preferred to figures 
based on utilities’ own accounting statements since it eliminates the risk of including rents captured 
by strong unions and self-rewards by executives.   
 
5.2 Estimation  
The derivation of an estimable spatial autoregressive model is not covered here since it has been 
thoroughly dealt with elsewhere (e.g. Mobley, 2003; Revelli, 2006; Zhou and Kockelman, 2009). 
Estimating (12) with the non-linear least square estimator, i.e. assuming strict exogeneity, shows that 
the specification suffers from over-parameterisation. A grid search approach starting with 1−=λ  and 
increasing in steps of 0.1 until λ=1 is therefore applied, showing that the residual sum of squared 
(RSS) for λ=1 is not significantly higher than the RSS for any other value of λ. This confirms 
previous findings that linear price models perform well in comparison with unconstrained 
transformations when firm heterogeneity is unobserved (Cropper et al., 1988).  
 
As we proceed, two problems can be noted. First, the three terms containing ip−  are endogenous by 
construction (LeSage and Pace, 2009) and, second, the residuals εi are likely to be heteroscedastic.18 
Instrumental variable approaches with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are offered by 
both 2SLS and two-stage, or ‘optimal’, GMM (OGMM),19 yet Lin and Lee (2010) note that OGMM is 
more efficient and potentially more robust. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) argue that a subset of 
neighbours’ covariates can be used as instruments to arrive at consistent spatial parameters. We chose 
this strategy and use neighbours’ fuel and labour prices as instruments for p-i. Further endogeneity 
problems can occur if qi is correlated with εi. Such correlation can occur from unobserved property 
characteristics. We use share of energy delivered to industrial customers (indi) and population in 
urban areas (popi) to control for this potential endogeneity. Although utilities determine the size of the 
network themselves, i?  is treated as exogenous since decisions to extend the network are typically 
made several years prior to the actual construction. In Section 4 we showed that public and private 
utilities are similar when comparing fundamental supply and demand conditions. bi is therefore 
treated as exogenous. Ideological composition of the local council can be endogenous to local 
                                                            
18 For example, heteroscedasticity can occur from unobserved variation in network age since some recently 
established utilities might want to use revenues to finance network expansions. Utilities operating mature 
networks can therefore be expected to have lower price variability.  
19 Kelejian and Prucha (2010) report that the maximum likelihood estimator is significantly biased in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity.  
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government tariffs.20 The indicator variable for right-wing majority (ri) is instrumented with ri,t-2, 
which refers to the situation in the previous electoral period.  
 
An OLS estimation is displayed in Column (a) in Table 1. Column (b) shows the output for when p-i, 
qi and ri are treated as endogenous, using the OGMM estimator. The results are consistent in terms of 
signs and significance levels, but γ2 (γ3) increases (decreases) in magnitude as the exogeneity 
assumptions are relaxed. Column (c) shows (12) when  iid −,  is excluded from the weight matrices. 
Comparing the RSS values for Column (b) and (c) shows that including iid −,  reduces RSS by over 6 
%. One can also observe that (c) is not as well-behaved as (a) and (b), which shows that it is important 
to incorporate the distance between neighbours in order to arrive at reasonable estimates. This finding 
supports Proposition 4.  
 
Based on estimates in Column (b), the average predicted price charged by POMs (669.2 SEK/MWh) 
is lower than the price set by IOM under left-wing councils (670.4 SEK/MWh), which in turn is lower 
than the price set by IOMs under right-wing councils (713.4 SEK/MWh). Although these prices are 
not statistically different, they point in the same direction as Proposition 1. As expected, there is no 
evidence that POMs take the prices of their closest neighbours into consideration. IOMs operating 
under left-wing councils ( 21 γγ + ), i.e. when the councils are relatively pro-consumer, internalise 
50% of the price adjustments made by their closest neighbours. The positive sign of 21 γγ +  lends 
support to Proposition 2 and the fact that 211 γγγ +<  is consistent with Proposition 3. We have 
already established that 1 1,
− =−iid  has a substantial role in identifying the relation between ip  and 
1=−ip  and that this supports Proposition 4. Further support for Proposition 4 is provided by the fact 
that 32121 γγγγγ ++>+ , i.e. that pro-consumer preferences of elected officials increase the 
threat. The combination of private ownership and the pro-firm preferences of right-wing councils 
( 321 γγγ ++ ) is apparently strong enough to statistically eliminate the threat of intervention.  
 
 
                                                            
20 A strategically behaving council can increase the price when income goes up, and Leigh (2005) shows that 
income (among several other socio-economics factors) influences voting behaviour.  
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Table 1. Estimation output.  
 OLS 
(a) 
  OGMM a 
(b) 
  OGMM 
(c) 
  
Variable Mean  SE Mean  SE Mean   SE 
1
1
1, =−− =− iii pd  0.0245 
 0.0239 0.0161  0.0235    
1
1
1, =−− =− iiii pdb  
0.3275 ** 0.1450 0.4843 ** 0.2059    
1
1
1, =−− =− iiiii pdbr  -0.0227 
 0.2672 -0.6252  0.4779    
1=−ip     0.2707  0.2502
1=−ii pb    0.6741  0.5182
1=−iii pbr     -0.9566 * 0.4921
bi 12.011  16.161 1.1954  21.248 -453.87  354.52
iibr  14.697  19.346 50.794  34.914 687.66 ** 341.47
qi 0.0464 ** 0.0194 0.0576 *** 0.0203 0.0647 *** 0.0218
i?  -0.2552 ** 0.0886 -0.2763 *** 0.0876 -0.2863 *** 0.0901
f
ip  0.1065 
** 0.0528 0.0994 ** 0.0479 0.1073 * 0.0556
l
ip  0.0114 
* 0.0067 0.0121 * 0.0063 0.0053  0.0080
mi -49.450  30.854 -34.654  30.775 -31.138  29.391
si -207.85 *** 70.907 -219.44 *** 68.247 -185.68 ** 79.268
Constant 437.38 *** 142.44 421.10 *** 133.01 382.11 *** 166.92
          
Ownership 
dummies 
Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
Hansen’s J     8.245   5.522   
Hansen’s P>J    0.221   0.238   
          
R2 0.453   0.446   0.375   
No. obs. 242   242   242   
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. SE are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity.  
a Instruments: f iii pd 1
1
1, =−− =− , 
f
iiii pdb 1
1
1, =−− =− , 
f
iiiiti pdbr 1
1
1,2, =−− =−− , l iii pd 11 1, =−− =− , l iiii pdb 11 1, =−− =− , 
l
iiiiti pdbr 1
1
1,2, =−− =−− , indi, popi, iti br 2, − .  
 
 
Other coefficients reveal that ip  increases for higher qi and decreases for higher i?  which is 
consistent with the view held by industry representatives and the results by Biggar and Söderberg 
(2011). Input prices are positively correlated with pi. The tests of Hansen’s J show that instruments 
are correctly excluded from the main equation and uncorrelated with εi in both Columns (b) and (c).  
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we claim that a plausible explanation for why unregulated investor-owned local 
monopolies do not always charge the monopoly price is that doing so may lead to customer 
complaints that in turn may lead to retaliations from local elected officials. Customers compare their 
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prices with those in neighbouring jurisdictions, and the probability of a complaint is positively 
correlated with the degree of spatial price heterogeneity. Elected officials have incentives to intervene 
when customers (i.e. voters) complain, yet the probability of intervention is reduced when elected 
officials have pro-firm preferences. We show that when utilities are subject to regulatory threat that 
originates from spatial price comparisons, the equilibrium price is located between the efficient and 
monopoly prices. Also, prices charged by neighbouring utilities are strategic complements, meaning 
that their prices are positively correlated. The spatial price correlation between neighbours increases 
when IOMs are exposed to relatively strong threat, i.e. when elected officials have pro-consumer 
preferences and neighbours are geographically close.   
 
The empirical analysis is based on a complete cross-sectional data set from the Swedish district 
heating sector in 2007. This sector is unique in that it consists of local monopolies that are owned by 
both private investors (IOM) and municipalities (POM), yet the monopolies are not subject to any 
formal price regulation. The analysis supports the theoretical predictions by showing that 1) POMs 
tend to set lower prices than IOMs; 2) IOMs that operate under left-wing councils (i.e. councils that 
are relatively pro-consumer) have lower prices than IOMs under right-wing councils; 3) IOMs under 
left-wing councils internalise as much as 50% of their neighbours’ prices; and 4) when the threat of 
intervention is lower, i.e. when IOMs operate under right-wing councils, there is no sign that they take 
their neighbours’ prices into consideration.  
 
Policy-wise one can conclude that the threat of regulatory intervention can effectively reduce IOMs’ 
incentive to use their marker power, yet a favourable situation for consumers is fragile since a change 
in the council’s ideological preferences can reduce the threat, which may lead to a substantial price 
increase.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Note that 0>′iπ , 0<′′iπ , 0<′isc  and 0>′′isc , as stated in the beginning of Section 2. It follows from 
0<′iws  and 0<′′iws  in the beginning of Section 2 that ii sc ′−<′< π0 , and iisc π ′′−<′′<0 . Thus, we 
obtain 
 
iiii scsc ′′′<′′′ ππ . (13) 
 
Note that ii ππ > , and ii sccs ′< , as stated in the beginning of Section 2. It follows from 
iiiiii wssccssw =+<+= ππ , that 
 
)(0 iiii sccs −−<−< ππ .  (14) 
 
Next, rearranging (8) in subsection 2.3 yields 
 
iiiiiiiii wswswsswws ′′−−′′<−′′−′′−< )1()(0 θθθθ  (15) 
 
The first inequality comes from 0<′iws , ii wssw < , 0>′iθ , and 0>′′iθ . Thus, 
iiii wsws ′′−−′′< )1(0 θθ  holds. Noting this and 10 << iθ , we have 
 
iiiiiiii scsc πθπθθθ ′′−−′′<′′−′′−< )1()1(0  (16) 
 
Then, it follows from (14) and (16) that: 
 
))1()(())1)((( iiiiiiiiiiii sccsscsc πθπθθθππ ′′−−′′−−<′′−′′−− . (17) 
 
We now check the sign of ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
′∂
i
i
i
i
ii
i
ii
RB
α
φ
α
ψ
φα ψφ2
1 . The sign of 
i
iRBα∂
′∂  depends on the sign 
inside the bracket. Noting that (13) and (17) hold, we obtain: 
 
))(1( iiiiii
i
i
ii
i
i scsc ′′′−′′′−′=∂
∂+∂
∂− ππθθα
φψφα
ψ
 
[ ))1)((( iiiiiii scsc ′′−′′−−′′+ θθππθ  
]))1()(( iiiiii sccs πθπθ ′′−+′′−+  
0< . (18) 
 
Therefore, 0<∂
′∂
i
iRBα . ■ 
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Proof of proposition 4 
 
Recall that ii SS > , 0>′iS , and 0<′′iS , as stated in Subsection 2.1. Also recall that 0>′iθ  and 
0>′′iθ , as stated in Subsection 2.2. We then calculate iφ  and iψ  as follows: 
 
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 0,ii i i i i i i i i i i
i
ES S S S S
p
φ μθ μθ μθ′′ ′ ′ ′′∂≡ = − − − − <∂  (19) 
( )2 0.ii i i i i i i i
i i
ES S S S
p p
ψ μθ μθ′ ′ ′′
−
∂≡ = + − >∂ ∂  (20) 
Next, we obtain 
 
( )
( )
2
1 .
i
i i i i i i i
i
i i
i
S S S S
S
φ θ θ θμ
φμ
′′ ′ ′ ′′
′′
∂ = − − − −∂
= −
 (21) 
 
Moreover, we have 
 
( )
0.
i
i i i i i
i
i
i
S S Sψ θ θμ
ψ
μ
′ ′ ′′∂ = + −∂
=
>
 (22) 
 
We now check the sign of i
i
BR
μ
′∂
∂ . Using (21) and (22), we obtain 
 
2
2
1
1
0.
i i i
i i
i i i
i
i
i
i
i
BR
S
ψ φφ ψμ μ μφ
ψ
μφ
′′
⎛ ⎞′ ∂ ∂∂ ⎜ ⎟= − +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂= − ∂
>
 (23) 
■ 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2.1. Sample statistics for privately and publicly owned utilities. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Publicly owned utilities (n=169)     
District heating list price 656.4 81.148 405.3 815.0 
Heating degree days 3 416 620.7 2 479 4 767 
Urban population 29 220 44 870 987 478 900 
Urban density 11.746 5.7443 3.6073 50.412 
Unit price of labour 21 510 626.1 20 100 24 100 
Unit price of fuel 174.61 103.8 -126.2 712.0 
Share of customers living in detached houses 0.1153 0.0731 0 0.3437 
Network length 89.301 127.6 4 932.5 
     
Privately owned utilities (n=73)     
District heating list price 697.6 51.260 543.6 783.7 
Heating degree days 3 333 498.3 2 479 4 408 
Urban population 30 090 94 960 1 571 770 900 
Urban density 11.822 7.0582 3.9585 44.756 
Unit price of labour 21 520 711.1 20 100 23 600 
Unit price of fuel 160.8 84.107 -59.771 525.17 
Share of customers living in detached houses 0.0920 0.0523 0.0061 0.2839 
Network length 64.814 162.02 3.2 1 200 
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Table A2.2 Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
ip  668.85 75.730 405.25 815.00 
1
1
1, =−− =− iii pd  57.047 155.13 6.7036 1 712.6 
1
1
1, =−− =− iiii pdb  14.607 29.755 0 165.55 
1
1
1, =−− =− iiiii pdbr  6.9246 21.805 0 164.53 
bi 0.6983 0.4599 0 1 
iibr  0.1364 0.3439 0 1 
qi 195.01 513.53 3.5 6 464 
i?  81.914 138.97 3.2 1 200 
f
ip  170.45 98.271 -126.22 711.98 
l
ip  21 512 651.42 20 100 24 100 
mi 0.3164 0.1734 0.0155 0.9329 
si 0.1083 0.0682 0 0.3437 
     
Instruments     
f
iii pd 1
1
1, =−− =−  21.068 121.08 -7.4644 1 807.6 
f
iiii pdb 1
1
1, =−− =−  16.997 121.13 -7.4644 1 807.6 
f
iiiiti pdbr 1
1
1,2, =−− =−−  1.1314 4.2282 0 34.615 
l
iii pd 1
1
1, =−− =−  1 866.8 5 364.2 265.25 59 916 
l
iiii pdb 1
1
1, =−− =−  1 408.4 5 402.5 0 59 916 
l
iiiiti pdbr 1
1
1,2, =−− =−−  128.52 473.47 0 4 349 
iti br 2, −  0.0909 0.2881 0 1 
popi 29 482 64 013 987 770 889 
indi 0.1116 0 1041 0 0 6546 
 
Sources: pi (Nils Holgersson’s annual price comparisons, www.nilsholgersson.nu); 1, =−iid (based on coordinates 
recorded at www.eniro.se); b (annual reports, utilities/municipalities directly); q, ?  (the Swedish District 
Heating Association (www.svenskfjarrvarme.se); fip (Statistics Sweden and utilities/municipalities directly); 
l
ip , mi, si, popi, indi, ri (Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se).  
 
